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Ambiguity and Policy Making: A Cognitive
Approach to Reconciling Chevron and Mead
Peter M. Shane
Abstract
When decided, both Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837 (1984), and United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218 (2001) were trumpeted,
whether by supporters or critics, as marking substantial changes in the law gov-
erning judicial review of agency statutory interpretation. This essay argues that
what the Court actually decided in each case was entirely consistent with the fab-
ric of the law of judicial review of administrative action as woven during earlier
decades. Unfortunately, however, the Court’s rhetoric in both opinions is confus-
ing and unhelpful at key points, creating impressions of substantial changes in the
law when none was being made. As a result, agencies, judges, and lawyers are
better served by focusing less on what Chevron and Mead say and more on what
they decided, and treating both decisions as elaborating a fairly straightforward
approach based on (a) judicial reaction to the clarity of the statute and (b) whether
the statute at issue is intended to create an opportunity for genuine agency pol-
icy making. In particular, a reviewing judge should first determine whether the
statute in question is susceptible to more than one plausible legal reading, and,
if only one plausible legal reading is available, the judge should bind the agency
to it. If, however, more than one plausible reading is available, the judge should
then ask whether the ambiguity in the statute signals an occasion for policy mak-
ing. In other words, is the agency, in filling the statutory gap at issue, intended
to balance expert judgment and relevant political values in order to accommo-
date the competing interests that need to be taken into account in order to further
Congress’s objectives in enacting the statute? If so, then, so long as the agency
has rationally identified any plausible statutory reading, the judge should consider
herself duty-bound to defer to it. If the statute does not contemplate significant
agency policy making in its interpretation, then the court should ask itself a third
question: Of the plausible readings available, does any appear to the court to be
plainly more attractive than its competitors? If not, then the court should likewise
defer to an agency choice of any rational interpretation because the agency is the
primary policy maker, and the court has no legal ground to prefer any alternative
reading to the agency’s own. If, however, the court initially finds one plausible
reading most compelling, then it retains the authority to impose that reading on
the agency. Before doing so, however, the court should pause, open-mindedly. It
should consider, if the agency has an alternative preference, whether the agency’s
reasoning is not in fact sufficient to make its alternative at least as attractive as the
court’s initial view. In such a case, notwithstanding its own initial view, the court
should deem itself persuaded by the agency’s statutory reading. This approach,
which is guided by the judicial sense of statutory clarity and does not speak of
ambiguities or certainties inherent in the statutory texts themselves, is the most
straightforward reconciliation of Chevron and Mead.
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I am grateful to John Hyson for the invitation to participate in the Chevron symposium,
and to my fellow panelists, whose insights greatly enriched my understanding.  Their failure to
disabuse me of any errors that remain in this essay is sincerely to be regretted.
1 The Court was unanimous, but truncated.  Justices Marshall and Rehnquist did not
participate in the argument or decision of the case; Justice O’Connor recused herself from the
decision.
2 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3 I attribute this language to Professor Pierce because it appears more or less
identically in two multi-authored volumes, of which he is the only common author.  The direct
quote is from I KENNETH CULP DAVIS AND RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 3.2 at 109 (3d ed. 1994).  Accord, RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, AND
PAUL R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 383-384 (4th ed. 2004).
4 DAVIS AND PIERCE, supra note 3, at 112.
5 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
6 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Ambiguity and Policy Making: A Cognitive Approach to Synthesizing Chevron and Mead
Peter M. Shane*
In the words of Professor Richard Pierce, the Supreme Court’s unanimous1 decision in
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council2 marked “the abandonment of its traditional
treatment of agency constructions of agency administered statutes.”3 It was an abandonment that
Professor Pierce applauded.4 Eighteen years later, dissenting from an otherwise unanimous
Court, Justice Scalia announced that United States v. Mead5 “has replaced the Chevron doctrine,”
thus producing “an avulsive change in judicial review of federal administrative action.”6 Justice
Scalia was not applauding.  He presumably wrote “avulsive change,” instead of “abandonment,”
because “avulsive” sounds violent and thus even scarier.  In any event, the responses of courts
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art19
7 Chevron was decided 6-0, and Mead, 8-1.
3
and scholars to both decisions confirm a clear verdict: Each case was and remains a very big
deal.
In this commentary, however, I would like to make three points: The first is that, to the
extent these cases are”big deals,” it is really not because of anything they actually decided.  What
they decided was consistent with the fabric of the law of judicial review of administrative action
as woven during earlier decades, which presumably explains why the Justices’ votes were so
lopsided in their favor.7 The second is that the Court’s rhetoric in both opinions is confusing and
unhelpful at key points, and, because confusing and unhelpful, perhaps creates impressions of
substantial changes in the law when none was being made.  The third is that it would now be
helpful to agencies, judges, and lawyers to focus less on what Chevron and Mead say and more
on what they decided, and to treat both decisions as following what I will elaborate, I hope, as a
fairly straightforward set of propositions regarding the review of agency interpretations of law.
I. Chevron as a Paradigm Non-Shift
Chevron, as is well known, focused on the scope of review to be indulged by federal
courts in reviewing agency interpretations of the statutes they administer.  Scope-of-review
doctrine, necessarily, is an instrument for modulating the relationships among the law and policy
making bodies of our national government.  As the scope of judicial review widens – or, to put it
another way, as the intensity of judicial review becomes more stringent – the voices of judges
(and of lawyers within agencies whose job is to anticipate judicial review) become more
pronounced in the elaboration of administrative law.  As the scope narrows, which is to say, as
the intensity of review becomes more lenient, agency discretion expands, and the power of courts
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
8 The expansion of agency discretion also expands the potential authority of central
policy makers within the executive branch who oversee agency regulatory activity on behalf of
the president.  See generally Elana Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245
(2001).
9 Pub.L. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685.
10 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6).
11 40 C.F.R §§ 51.18(j)(1)(i) and (ii) (1983) (emphasis supplied).
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and agency lawyers diminishes.8 Thus, in deciding the appropriate deference to afford agency
interpretations of statutory law, the Court is inevitably making a statement about where authority
lies for resolving ambiguities in the texts that Congress enacts.  
The ambiguity at issue in Chevron pertained to implementation of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977.9 Those amendments required certain states to establish permit programs
regulating what the statute called “new or modified major stationary sources” of air pollution.10
EPA, charged with issuing rules to govern the program adoption process, promulgated a plant-
wide definition of the statutory term, “stationary source.”  That is, a single stationary source was
taken to comprise “all of the pollutant-emitting activities which belong to the same industrial
grouping, are located on one or more contiguous or adjacent properties, and are under the control
of the same person (or persons under common control) except the activities of any vessel.”11 If
only some subset of pollutant-emitting activity within such a grouping were modified, and if that
modification did not increase the overall pollution emitted from the plant as a whole, then the
modification would not require a permit.  The purpose behind this approach was to permit
polluters to make improvements within existing plants even if the improved facilities would not
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art19
12 42 U.S.C. § 7501(3).  
13 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(2).
14 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 848-64.
15 Id. at 865.
16 “The court is first required to decide whether the [administrator] acted within the
scope of his authority. . . Section 706(2)(A) [further] requires a finding that the actual choice
made was not ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.’ 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1964 ed., Supp. V). To make this finding the court must consider
whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has
been a clear error of judgment.”  Citizens for Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16
(1971).
5
provide the “lowest achievable emission rate”12 with regard to regulated pollutants, and could
thus not qualify for state permits under the Clean Air Act Amendments.13
Let us put off for a moment the Court’s description of its scope-of-review doctrine in
Chevron, and look only at what it actually decided.  The Court decided that the EPA could adopt
the plant-wide interpretation of “stationary source” because Congress had not precluded that
approach,14 and because EPA’s interpretation was “reasonable,” in the specific sense of
representing a rational policy choice for implementing the Clean Air Act.15 This holding was
entirely consistent with the sizeable body of preexisting law mandating judicial deference to
agency policy choices.16 The only thing unusual about Chevron is that the EPA’s policy choice
was necessarily embedded in its reading of a particular statutory provision.  Given the structure
of the statute, the question, “What is sound policy?” became conflated with the question, “What
do the words ‘major stationary source,’ in 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6), mean?”
That the core exercise at issue here was one of policy making and not linguistic
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
17 This paragraph reiterates the basic points of an analysis that appears also at JERRY
L. MASHAW, RICHARD A. MERRILL, AND PETER M. SHANE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 800-02 (5th ed. 2003).
18 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
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interpretation is perhaps most evident if one conducts a simple thought experiment.17 Imagine
that Congress explicitly provided in the 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) that “major stationary source”
could be defined by EPA on a plant-wide or isolated basis, as appropriate.  In making that choice,
EPA would, of course, still have to be prepared to defend its policy against a subsequent charge
of being “arbitrary” or “capricious” under the Administrative Procedure Act.18 In anticipation of
judicial review, it would assemble certain evidence and arguments on behalf of its policy.  And,
under well-established law, its evidence and arguments would be reviewable, but only with
deference.  My suggestion, however, is that the evidence and arguments EPA would adduce in
my hypothetical case would turn out to be exactly the same evidence and arguments offered in
Chevron in support of its statutory interpretation.  Moreover, the decision in Chevron that
Congress had not legally precluded the plant-wide approach was tantamount to situating EPA
legally just exactly as I have hypothesized – giving it discretion to adopt the plant-wide approach
or not.  Thus, the Court acted consistently with prior law in realizing that the conflation of a
policy question with an interpretive question should not entitle the agency to less deference than
it would otherwise enjoy.
There are points in Chevron where the Court seems to say fairly clearly what I just said –
that the exercise at issue was one of policy making, not one of textual exegesis.  As Justice
Stevens states: “[T]he Administrator’s interpretation represents a reasonable accommodation of
manifestly competing in terests and is entitled to deference: the regulatory scheme is technical
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art19
19 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
20 Id. at 842-43 (emphasis added).
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and complex,  the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion,  and the
decision involves reconciling conflicting policies.”19 Unfortunately, the Stevens opinion
prefaced its analysis of the Clean Air Act with a statement of interpretive method for judges that
took a fairly straightforward proposition and made it seem rather more revolutionary.  In a now
all-but-ubiquitously cited passage, he wrote:
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is
confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose
its own construction on the statute,  as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.20
What makes this language so startling is the seeming ease with which administrators can now
find themselves enjoying a level of deference on questions of statutory interpretation that is as
great as the deference they enjoy on matters of policy.  Read literally, what is commonly called
“Chevron Step One” requires a reviewing court first to determine if Congress had spoken on “the
precise question at issue,” has done so “directly,” and has done so with enough specificity so that
the resolution is not “ambiguous.”  Only if the answer is affirmative may the court decline to
defer to the agency.  Whenever the answer to Chevron Step One is negative – whenever Congress
has addressed the general subject in question, but not the precise issue, or has spoken only
indirectly, or has left its command ambiguous – then a court is to defer to the agency reading of
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
21 See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (denying lower courts authority to constrain agency decision
making based on judicially crafted procedural requirements that exceed the mandates of
applicable constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provisions); Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council (1983) (setting aside, as unjustifiable interference with
agency policy making,  D.C. Circuit invalidation of Nuclear Regulatory Commission
regulations).
22 Accord, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 408 U.S.
421, 446 (affirming appropriateness of using “traditional tools of statutory construction” in
interpreting the Immigration and Naturalization Act).
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the law.  Naively, one might thus regard Chevron as mandating deference under every question
of statutory interpretation ever likely to arise in litigation.
But it is more sensible not to give Chevron this literal a reading.  The categorical quality
of Justice Stevens’ prose probably reflected more than anything the intensity of his intended
rebuke to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which the Court has
occasionally thought a little too ready to impose its views of the law on the agencies it reviews.21
Under a more pragmatic reading of Chevron, the first question facing a judge upon judicial
review of a question of statutory interpretation should not be whether Congress has spoken
“directly” and without ambiguity to the precise question at issue.  The question should be
whether, reviewing the language in dispute, the judge finds herself believing that the statute is
susceptible to only a single legally persuasive interpretation.  The judge may answer this
question with recourse to all the usual tools of statutory reading.22 And, if the answer is
affirmative, then she may – indeed, must – bind the agency to that interpretation.  If not, she
should move to Chevron Step Two.
Shifting the focus of Chevron Step One from an inquiry into some inherent quality of the
statutory text to the judicial understanding of that text may seem like taking liberties, but there is
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art19
23 See, e.g., General Dynamics Land Systems v. Cline, 124 S.Ct. 1236 (2004).  The
majority determined, contrary to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, that the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act does not prohibit discrimination against younger workers. 
Interpreting the ADEA as precluding the EEOC interpretation, the Court said: “Even for an
agency able to claim all the authority possible under Chevron, deference to its statutory
interpretation is called for only when the devices of judicial construction have been tried and
found to yield no clear sense of congressional intent. . . . Here, regular interpretive method leaves
no serious question, not even about purely textual ambiguity in the ADEA.”  Id. at 1248.  In
contrast, siding with the EEOC, Justice Thomas, dissenting for himself and Justice Kennedy
wrote: “This should have been an easy case. The plain language of 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)
mandates a particular outcome: that the respondents are able to sue for discrimination against
them in favor of older workers.”  Id. at 1249 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Only Justice Scalia,
writing also in dissent, would have reached the stage of judicial deference and upheld the agency
on grounds of reasonableness.  Id. at 1249 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  To the same effect, see
Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478 (1990) (upholding, 5-4, an administrative interpretation of the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children Act, based on the statute’s unambiguous meaning, in
the face of a dissent that would overturn the agency, also based on the assertedly unambiguous –
but opposite – meaning of the act).
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ample evidence that this is how Chevron is, in fact, implemented.  A Supreme Court has more
than once bound an agency to a statutory interpretation under Chevron Step One over a dissent
that reaches the opposite conclusion, also allegedly based on the clear meaning of the statute.23 If
both the majority and dissent were really asking the question whether the text at issue was
inherently ambiguous, the very existence of the two contending positions would demand an
affirmative answer.  What the disputing Justices are actually in saying in these cases is that, read
in the way that lawyers and judges read statutes, there is only one reading of the statute that is
persuasive as a matter of law.  That is something about which judges may sensibly disagree;
whether or not a statute is unambiguous as a purely linguistic matter usually is not.
II. The Exaggerated Ferment of Mead
In addition to the disarray that the wording of Chevron Step One made more or less
inevitable, Chevron actually gave birth to a less-noticed confusion – an uncertainty whether what
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
24 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
25 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron ‘s Domain, 89 GEO.
L.J. 833, 872 (2001) (“[I]f Chevron rests on a presumption about congressional intent, then
Chevron should apply only where Congress would want Chevron to apply.   In delineating the
types of delegations of agency authority that trigger Chevron deference, it is therefore important
to determine whether a plausible case can be made that Congress would want such a delegation
to mean that agencies enjoy primary interpretational authority”).
26 I would have doubted such a reading because Justice Stevens is explicit that the
EPA was entitled to deference regardless of the circumstances that resulted in the ambiguity of
the Clean Air Act Amendments: “Congress intended to accommodate [the competing policy]
interests, but did not do so itself on the level of specificity presented by these cases. Perhaps that
body consciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance at this level, thinking that those
with great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the provision would be in a
better position to do so; perhaps it simply did not consider the question at this level; and perhaps
Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the question, and those on each side
decided to take their chances with the scheme devised by the agency. For judicial purposes, it
10
Justice Stevens called the “first” question under Chevron was itself actually the second. In
explaining the Court’s rationale for deference, Justice Stevens wrote:
 If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute
by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they
are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the
legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than
explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a
statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency.24 
The apparent link between Chevron’s approach to scope of review and a theory of legislative
delegation led some to question whether the Chevron doctrine was applicable only where
Congress had actually delegated authority to an agency, whether explicitly or implicitly, to
interpret the statute in question.25 If so, then an inquiry into the presence of such a delegation
would represent an antecedent step before the so-called Chevron Step One.
I would have thought such a reading of Chevron was fanciful,26 except, 17 years later, it
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art19
matters not which of these things occurred.”  467 U.S. at 865.  If Congress “did not consider the
question at this level,” it would be odd to consider the resulting ambiguity a “delegation,” except
by pure judicial imputation.
27 Mead, 533 U.S. at 224.
28 19 U.S.C. § 1202.
29 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 224
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was expressly adopted by the Supreme Court in United States v. Mead. That case considered
whether the Customs Service acted permissibly in reclassifying the Mead Corporation’s imported
“‘day planners,’ three-ring binders with pages having room for notes of daily schedules and
phone numbers and addresses, together with a calendar and suchlike,”27 under the Harmonized
Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS).28 That statute provides that “[d]iaries, notebooks
and address books, bound;  memorandum pads, letter pads and similar articles,” are subject to
tariff, while “other” items that might also be deemed “[r]egisters, account books, notebooks,
order books, receipt books, letter pads, memorandum pads, diaries and similar articles,” enter
free of duty.  The Customs Service, after many years of placing day planners within the “other”
category, had changed its mind and interpreted the HTSUS as encompassing day planners within
the phrase, “Diaries, notebooks and address books, bound.”  This ruling was set forth in one of
the agency’s so-called “ruling letters,” through which the agency sets tariff classifications for
particular imports.29
The eight-Justice majority in Mead declined to apply Chevron. As construed in Mead,
Chevron applies only in limited circumstances:
[I]t can . . . be apparent from the agency’s generally conferred authority and other
statutory circumstances that Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with
the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
30 Id. at 229 (emphasis added).
31 Id. at 234.
12
law, even one about which “Congress did not actually have an intent” as to a particular
result.  When circumstances implying such an expectation exist, a reviewing court has no
business rejecting an agency’s exercise of its generally conferred authority to resolve a
particular statutory ambiguity simply because the agency’s chosen resolution seems
unwise, but is obliged to accept the agency’s position if Congress has not previously
spoken to the point at issue and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.30
Because the Mead Court discerned no congressional “expectation” that the Customs Service
would “be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the” HTSUS, it
found Chevron inapposite.  It nonetheless found that the lower court erred in refusing to accord
any deference at all to the Customs Service’s ruling on day timers.
The lower court’s mistake, according to Mead, was its failure to recognize that, even in
cases falling outside the purview of Chevron, agency interpretations of agency-administered
statutes are still entitled to some deference.  As the Court explained, “[A]n agency’s
interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form, given the ‘specialized experience and
broader investigations and information’ available to the agency, and given the value of
uniformity in its administrative and judicial understandings of what a national law requires.”31 In
other words, even if Congress did not delegate interpretive authority to an agency, there may still
be reasons, all things being equal, to prefer administrative readings of statutes to the preferred
readings of judges.  Based on these reasons, an agency interpreting its statute, but outside the
purview of a Chevron delegation, is entitled to a kind of deference described by Justice Jackson
in his opinion in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.: “The weight [accorded to an administrative] judgment
in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art19
32 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
33 Mead, 533 U.S. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”32 In other words, depending on the
“totality of the circumstances,”33 a judge should defer to an agency reading if she is persuaded
that it is worthy of deference.
In recognition of the surface doctrinal complexity of all this, one can be excused a long
moment to let it all sink in.  As in Chevron, the Court in Mead has expressed its rationale for a
fairly straightforward holding with head-scratch-worthy maladroitness.  First, again taking the
Court literally, judges may be forgiven a little puzzlement for wondering what it means to defer
to a statutory interpretation to the extent one finds it persuasive.  If a proffered reading is
persuasive, then it requires no deference to adopt it.  If I take your view of something because I
think you are right, I am not deferring to you; I am agreeing with you.  Moreover, it is not clear
what the Court means when it says there are occasions when “Congress would expect the agency
to be able to speak with the force of law” in implementing a statute.  That is to say, when
Congress empowers an agency to compel public compliance with a statute, is it not always
empowering the agency to “speak with the force of law?”  The Customs directive to Mead to pay
duty on its imported day timers was not merely hortatory.
Yet, once again, the Court’s puzzling prose should not obscure what seems an utterly
straightforward result.  In deciding whether or not a day timer is a bound diary, the Customs
Service was not engaged in anything that we can recognize as actual policy making.  The
arguments it faced were as follows: On one hand, day timers fit a common definition of diary,
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
34 Id. at 225.
35 Id. at 226.
36 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
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which “reflects commercial usage,” and the three-ringer binder does, in fact, bind the book
together.34 On the other hand, day timers contain “no space for ‘relatively extensive notations
about events, observations, feelings, or thoughts’ in the past,” and, if ring-fastening counts as
“binding,” it is hard to imagine what an “unbound” diary would look like.35 The terminology of
the HTSUS does require Customs to make a choice about this, but the competition of values and
potential impacts on society that are the hallmarks of a genuine policy question hardly lurk here. 
The agency is just trying to give the tariff schedule a plausible reading.  It makes sense to say that
the views of the agency, which does this kind of thing for a living, ought not to be dismissed
without due consideration.  On the other hand, this does not appear to be the kind of question that
would require, in the words of Chevron ,“a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing
interests,” through a decision that “involves reconciling conflicting policies.”36 On the contrary,
the agency determination at issue would seemingly come as close as possible to a case of
straightforwardly applying a policy determination that another body, Congress, has already made.
This is evident also in the procedure by which Customs announced its determination. 
Tariff classifications for particular imports are announced through so-called “ruling letters.”
Ruling letters apply only to the specific items on which they rule, and to such other items as may
be identical to them.  They are issued without notice and comment, and are not published except
insofar as they must be made available for public inspection.  Customs Headquarters and all
port-of-entry Customs offices are equally empowered to issue ruling letters, and they typically
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art19
37 Mead, 533 U.S. at 221-24
38 Id. at 229.
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“contain little or no reasoning, but simply describe goods and state the appropriate category and
tariff.”37 Of course, the relatively summary nature of this process does not render the result
necessarily arbitrary, and a court should think twice before insisting that the agency did not know
a diary when it saw one.  On the other hand, a judicial conviction that the agency had confused a
hawk with a handsaw would hardly disturb the deployment of some nuanced policy judgment
essential to effecting a congressional regulatory scheme.  Overturning a Customs HTSUS
interpretation would not be unsettling the kind of deliberate expert judgment, resting on a
measured and exacting account of competing interests and contending positions, that went into
the agency judgment at issue in Chevron. That is why, on the Mead facts, full Chevron deference
would seem so misplaced.
III.  A Cognitive Approach to Chevron and Mead
Abstracted from the unsurprising holdings of Chevron and Mead, the two decisions seem
to articulate two approaches to judicial deference in the face of agency statutory interpretation,
and two corresponding rationales explaining why each mode of deference is appropriate to its
context.  According to Mead, Chevron deference is owed whenever “[i]t is apparent from the
agency’s generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress would
expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the
statute or fills a space in the enacted law.”38 In such a case, “If. . .Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, [but] the statute is silent or ambiguous . . .the question” 
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is whether “the Administrator’s view . . .is a reasonable one.”39 On the other hand,
Mead/Skidmore deference is appropriate, outside the Chevron context, whenever there is value to
acknowledging the “specialized experience and broader investigations and information”40
available to the agency, and  the importance of uniformity in administrative and judicial
understandings of what a national law requires.  In those cases, “The weight of [agency]
judgment . . .will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give
it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”41
All of this strikes me, however, as rather more complicated than is necessary.  Indeed, it
may be easier for all concerned to look at the judicial review of statutory interpretation not, as the
Court seems to say, in terms of qualities embodied in the statutes being interpreted, but instead
from the cognitive position of the judge conducting a review of the agency reading.  At the risk
of simply projecting my own mind-set, I hypothesize that judges, asked to read statutes (in the
first instance or on judicial review of agency action) always form one of three conclusions upon
conducting the exercise.  In one set of cases, judges form the conclusion – taking into account the
statutory text, Congress’s evident purposes, and all other legally relevant interpretive material –
that the statute is susceptible to only one legally plausible reading.  That is, the statute may be
ambiguous to a linguist, but not to a lawyer.  In such cases, it does not matter whether one is
drinking from Mead or breathing in the fumes of Chevron.  The Court’s stance will, in both
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cases, be the same: Did the agency adopt the only plausible reading of the statute?  If so, uphold. 
If not, vacate and remand.
In a second set of cases, judges are likely to conclude that they cannot tell what the statute
means, or, rather, that there are available a set of readings, each of which is plausible and none
much more plausible than the others, so that the judge really has no conviction as to the
appropriate statutory interpretation.  In this category, too, the choice between Mead and Chevron
is irrelevant.  Courts should defer in both cases to any reasonable agency reading because
agencies, not courts, are the institutions primarily tasked with the implementation of
administrative programs.  If a court has no conviction as to a statute’s certain or even most
appealing meaning, then it ought to defer to the agency not only for the reasons adduced in Mead,
but also out of respect for a foundational aspect of the separation of powers – the priority of
agencies over courts in making administrative policy.
That brings us to the third set of cases, cases in which a judge believes a statute
susceptible to multiple plausible readings, but in which one of those readings seems to the judge
to be most attractive or compelling.  It is in this category, and only in this category, that the
Chevron - Mead differentiation truly makes an actual difference.  If we are “at the Chevron
station,” to invoke the classic Schuck and Elliot pun,42 then, so long as the judge agrees the
agency has found a reasonable reading, she is duty-bound to defer to the agency.  The fact that
the judge thinks the agency would have done better pursuing a different policy is not relevant.  If
we’re in Mead territory, however, then the judge may insist on her preferred reading.  It becomes
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the judicial duty in such cases to say what the law is.  Understandably, before determining that a
judicial reading is truly the more attractive, Mead instructs the judge to attend conscientiously to
everything the agency says in defense of its view and to acknowledge whatever care was taken
procedurally to insure a thorough airing within the agency of all the competing possibilities and
counter-arguments.  Fair enough.  After all, Justice Frankfurter once wisely spoke of the
legislative specification of a standard of review as chiefly expressing a “mood.”  A judge
imbibing Mead will still be sober, not heady with authority, but unpersuaded where agency
reasoning falls short.  That’s the Mead mood.
Of course, at this point, the obvious question is, when is Chevron the guiding standard
and when Mead? On this point, the Mead formulation is not optimal.  Rather than ask, is it
“apparent from the agency’s generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that
Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses”43
the ambiguity in issue, I would ask whether it is “apparent from the agency’s generally conferred
authority and other statutory circumstances” that the ambiguity in question signals an appropriate
occasion for the agency to fill the statutory hole by making policy.   I would ask, that is, echoing
Chevron, whether, in interpreting the statute in question, the agency was required to apply its
expert judgment and public policy acumen in order to “accommodate . . . manifestly competing
interests,” and reconcile potentially conflicting values and goals.  If that is what at stake, then
courts should defer; if not, then not.  This is not because, in cases of genuine administrative
policy making, administrators are anticipated lawmakers.  Rather, it is because they are hired to
make policy.  For example, the ambiguity in Chevron regarding “stationary sources” was clearly
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an occasion for administrative policy making in just this sense.  The ambiguity in Mead
regarding types of stationery was not. 
My suggested synthesis of the Court’s leading cases on reviewing agency statutory
interpretation would thus replace the Chevron Two-Step with a more elaborate Chevron - Mead
waltz.  First, the reviewing judge should determine whether the statute in question is susceptible
to more than one plausible legal reading. If only one plausible legal reading is available, the
judge should bind the agency to it.  
If more than one plausible reading is available, the judge should then ask whether the
ambiguity in the statute signals an occasion for genuine agency policy making.  In other words,
the court should determine whether the function of the agency, in filling the statutory gap at
issue, entails balancing expert judgment and relevant political values in order to accommodate
the competing interests that need to be taken into account in order to further Congress’s
objectives in enacting the statute.  If so, then, so long as the agency has rationally identified any
plausible statutory reading, the judge should consider herself duty-bound to defer to it.  
If not, then the court must ask itself a third question: Of the plausible readings available,
does any appear to the court to be plainly more attractive than its competitors?  If not, then the
court should likewise defer to an agency choice of any rational interpretation because the agency
is the primary policy maker, and the court has no legal ground to prefer any alternative reading to
the agency’s own.  If, however, the court initially finds one plausible reading most compelling,
then it retains the authority to impose that reading on the agency.  Before doing so, however, the
court should pause, open-mindedly.  It should consider, if the agency has an alternative
preference, whether the agency’s reasoning is not in fact sufficient to make its alternative at least
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as attractive as the court’s initial view.  In such a case, notwithstanding that view, the court
should deem itself persuaded by the agency’s statutory reading.
Two objections to this approach may be readily anticipated.  The first is that, because my
approach foregrounds the role of the judge as reader, rather than congressional intention in
framing a disputed statute, my reformulation runs the risk of resuscitating the judicial
overstepping that provoked Justice Stevens’s Chevron two-step rhetoric in the first place. The
Supreme Court, were it to adopt my prose, could meet this objection by appending the following:
“In reviewing agency interpretations of law, judges should think of themselves as readers of last
resort in a three-way collaboration.  Where Congress has manifested a legislative purpose, that
purpose controls court and agency.  Where it has left room for policy making, the agency is the
constitutionally appropriate policy maker.”
The second is that my approach may seem to invite a less predictable course of
implementation than does Chevron. That is, judges may differ subjectively about when statutory
ambiguity signals moments for significant agency policy making in a way that judges would not
differ about when to apply Chevron Step One or Step Two.  My reply to that is three-fold.  First,
there is ample room for subjectivity in the application of Chevron, as that decision’s checkered
career in the Supreme Court amply demonstrates.44 Second, even if lower courts were reasonably
consistent about applying Chevron before 2001, the resurrection of Skidmore deference via Mead
is likely to induce the same lower court fluctuations in statutory interpretation that have always
been evident in the Supreme Court itself.  But my third response is really the most important:
Conceding that my approach may be more conspicuous than the Chevron formulation in inviting
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art19
21
judges actually to exercise judgment, it at least invites judgment on the right thing – namely, the
proper scope for agency policy making in interpreting administrative statutes.  I do not believe I
am pointing judges towards any destination different from the direction of Chevron and Mead,
read together.  I am just being clearer about the nature of the journey.  In an area of doctrine now
fraught with rhetorical confusion, some new measure of clarity would be a virtue.
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